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IDEOLOGY
A ccording to Žižek’s neo-Marxist conception, ideology consists of a relatively ﬂ uid set of representations that constitute social subjectivity, together with 
a core of communal practices that condition the unconscious libidinal invest-
ments of subjects in their political community. Th ese libidinal investments are 
structured by unconscious social fantasy and ballast the subject’s political alle-
giances with a kernel of enjoyment, which determines a relatively ﬁ xed loyalty to 
the institutional rituals of the political community.
Because political communities that rely on ideology for social cohesion, and 
therefore political inclusion, depend upon exclusions that are constructed in 
fantasy and supported by enjoyment – for instance, the ﬁ gure of the Jew as mar-
ginalized alien – the institutional rituals of the nation state reinforce domina-
tion. Th us, while individuals may espouse a range of liberal beliefs and identify 
with progressive ideals, they “know not what they do” when they participate, 
despite their ideals and beliefs, in the material practices of the nation state, the 
church congregation or the social group, where they unconsciously enjoy a form 
of belonging that may be antithetical to their expressed politics.
Žižek’s theorization of “enjoyment as a political factor” has important implica-
tions for both ideology critique and political strategy, as his thesis of a persistent 
kernel of enjoyment at the heart of ideology aﬀ ects questions of universality, belief 
and history. Additionally, Žižek theorizes that modern ideology has undergone 
a decisive mutation in the post-1960s era, as global capitalism erodes liberal 
ideals, human rights and democratic citizenship. Increasingly, modern subjects 
are exposed to a superego injunction to “enjoy!” consumerism, nationalism and 
other potentially exploitative and oppressive collective practices, shorn of the 
symbolic ﬁ ctions of equality, liberty and solidarity. Ultimately, the existence of 
ideology is linked to the commodity form as the structuring principle of modern 
subjectivity, so that a politics of truth, in opposition to ideology, must include not 
only traversal of the fantasy through identiﬁ cation with the sinthome, but also a 
revolutionary set of anti-capitalist social practices.
Žižek’s conception of ideology is a radicalization of post-Marxist theories 
that arose from Althusserian Marxism. Drawing on the categories of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser had deﬁ ned ideology as an 
“imaginary relationship … to the real conditions of existence” (Althusser 1971: 
153). For Althusser, the mutual recognition of liberal subjects as autonomous 
individuals who are the bearers of (political, legal, civil and social) rights exem-
pliﬁ ed the imaginary misrecognition characteristic of ideology, in so far as these 
subjects regarded themselves as the free authors of society when in fact they 
were its products. From Althusser’s Marxist perspective, ideology is a necessary 
illusion that acts as a social cement because it provides a form of subjectivity 
that corresponds to the prevailing economic and political relations. It supplies 
subjects whose lived experience of themselves is as compliant workers, family 
persons and democratic citizens … but not socialist militants, members of revo-
lutionary collectives or participants in a radically egalitarian political commu-
nity. Ideology therefore constitutes subjectivity through the material practices, 
or institutional rituals, of the “ideological state apparatuses”, such as the family 
and church, school and media, the ballot box and the trade union, which “inter-
pellate” (“hail” or subjectivize) biological individuals into social subjects. For 
Althusser, the ideas and beliefs of the subject are eﬀ ects of “material practices, 
governed by material rituals, which are themselves deﬁ ned by the material ideo-
logical apparatus” (ibid.: 169).
To make his point clear, Althusser quoted Pascal’s provocative remark on the 
relation between church ritual and Christian belief: “kneel down [often enough] 
and you will believe!” ( ibid.: 114). Unfortunately, however, Althusser could not 
fully theorize either the process of interpellation as symbolic identiﬁ cation, or 
the unconscious enjoyment produced by the institutional ritual. Despite the 
inﬂ uence of psychoanalysis on his categories, “Althusser’s theory of ideology 
trails Lacanian resonances without meaningful correspondence” (Barrett 1993: 
175).
Žižek’s position is strongly inﬂ uenced by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouﬀ e’s 
post-Marxist theory of ideology, which considerably developed the concept of 
ideological interpellation. Ideologies are conceptualized as composed of signiﬁ ers 
that constitute the political identities of social groups, but that “ﬂ oat” because 
they can be articulated into various constellations, so that the struggle to articu-
late a hegemonic ideology is always open. Žižek’s concise summary of their posi-
tion cannot be bettered:
the multitude of “ﬂ oating signiﬁ ers”, of proto-ideological elements, is 
structured into a uniﬁ ed ﬁ eld through the intervention of a [master-
signiﬁ er] which “quilts” them, stops their sliding and ﬁ xes their meaning. 
Ideological space is made of non-bound, non-tied elements, “ﬂ oating 
signiﬁ ers”, whose very identity is “open”, overdetermined by their articu-
lation in a chain with other elements … Th e “quilting” performs the 
totalization by means of which this free ﬂ oating of ideological elements 
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is halted, ﬁ xed – that is to say, by means of which they become parts of 
the structured network of meaning.  (SO: 87)
According to Laclau and Mouﬀ e, hegemonic articulation in democratic poli-
tics consists in the rival eﬀ orts of social alliances to install their master-signiﬁ -
ers as universals in the “empty place of power”. Not only does this assign to all 
social forces a particular position and political identity, it also deﬁ nes universality 
because every such quasi-universal signiﬁ er has particular contents. Finally, the 
“hegemonization of the universal” through ideological struggle not only deﬁ nes 
the particular contents of the empty place of universality, but also acts as a social 
cement by constituting social subjectivity through identiﬁ cation with the domi-
nant universal, or master- signiﬁ er. Th e process of ideological interpellation can 
be recast in terms of symbolic identiﬁ cation, where subjects constitute their 
political identity through identiﬁ cation with the master-signiﬁ er. But, Laclau 
and Mouﬀ e add, the process is never ﬁ nal and identity is never ﬁ xed, because 
the formation of a reigning universal happens adversarially, through the nega-
tion of a social antagonist whose master-signiﬁ er is entirely excluded from the 
hegemonic ideology. Th is formation of a “constitutive outside” to society through 
a process of absolute exclusion means that every social identity, formed through 
symbolic identiﬁ cation with the master-signiﬁ er, is negated by something that is 
by deﬁ nition a meaningless element. Describing this as social antagonism, Laclau 
and Mouﬀ e argue that the excluded element embodies negativity as such, and is 
therefore demonized as hostile to the principle of society itself – the Jew, commu-
nism, the terrorist and so forth. As a result, the ideological struggle to hegemonize 
the content of the universal is marked by a symptomatic performative contradic-
tion, between a neutral-universal political statement and its partisan position 
of enunciation by members of political communities sustained by exclusions.
According to Žižek, theories descended from the Althusserian concept of 
ideological interpellation lack a properly psychoanalytic dimension because they 
develop the dimension of the signiﬁ er – of symbolic identiﬁ cation and imaginary 
identity – at the expense of the unconscious investment in the institutional ritual 
– the dimension of the Real of enjoyment structured by the social fantasy. Žižek 
therefore proposes to grasp ideology through Lacan’s “graph of desire”, which 
outlines the structure of the subject as consisting of two levels:
 • the Symbolic/Imaginary level of interpellation, where the “interplay of 
imaginary and symbolic identiﬁ cation under the dominance of symbolic 
identiﬁ cation constitutes the mechanism by means of which the subject is 
integrated into a socio-symbolic ﬁ eld” (SO: 110);
 • the Symbolic/Real level of what escapes symbolization and is beyond inter-
pellation, “the square of desire, fantasy, [the signiﬁ er of ] lack in the Other 
and drive, pulsating around some unbearable surplus-enjoyment” (SO: 124).
Th e distinction between these levels is crucial for Žižek’s critique of ideology. 
Th e connection between them can be explained by asking a simple question: 
why is there anything at all “beyond interpellation”? Why does the identity of 
the subject not close and become ﬁ xed around symbolic identiﬁ cation with the 
master-signiﬁ er and the resulting imaginary identity of the ego? For Žižek, the 
answer is: the radical contingency of naming, itself a consequence of the arbi-
trary character of the signiﬁ er. Nothing in the ﬁ eld of the Other can guarantee 
the ﬁ t between the social identity of the subject and the “ineﬀ able singularity” 
of the drives arising at the boundary between soma and psyche. Consequently, 
symbolic identiﬁ cation with a master-signiﬁ er represents a sort of “pre-emptive 
strike”, an eﬀ ort by the subject to anticipate what object they are in the desire of 
the Other. In other words, the subject kneels down in an attempt to guess what 
the Other wants from them, and the surplus enjoyment that results from this 
act of renunciation, or submission to the Other, then provides the unconscious 
ballast that supports the subject’s convictions about religious (or political) dogma 
through all of their crises of doubt, changes of faith and confessions of ﬁ delity.
Žižek’s theory of ideology may be described as a properly Lacanian interpre-
tation of Althusser’s concept of ideological interpellation through institutional 
rituals. But this also incorporates the post-Marxist conception of ideological 
hegemony constituted through social antagonism. Žižek argues that ideology cri-
tique therefore consists of two distinct operations. One is discursive, the “symp-
tomal reading” of the ideological text, bringing about the “deconstruction” of 
the spontaneous experience of its meaning – that is, demonstrating how a given 
ideological ﬁ eld is a result of a montage of heterogeneous “ﬂ oating signiﬁ ers”, of 
their totalization through the intervention of certain “nodal points”; the other 
aims at extracting the kernel of enjoyment, at articulating the way in which – 
beyond the ﬁ eld of meaning but at the same time internal to it – an ideology 
implies, manipulates, produces a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fan-
tasy (SO: 125).
Th e dimension of ideology beyond interpellation has four aspects, which 
determine the four major innovations in the theory of ideology that Žižek has 
achieved:
 • Th e subject’s ego-ideal forms through symbolic identiﬁ cation with the ide-
ological master- signiﬁ er, but the inverse of the master-signiﬁ er “beyond 
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interpellation” is an unconscious superego imperative to “enjoy” transgres-
sions of the norms represented by the reigning universal.
 • Th e subject’s unconscious desire is determined by the Other (desire is the 
desire of the Other: Lacan), which depends on exclusions to maintain the 
illusion of the consistency of the socio-symbolic ﬁ eld, so that the subject 
entertains the fantasy of the theft of enjoyment (by the Other or some mar-
ginalized other), with the consequence that the dark logic of sacriﬁ ce is at 
the heart of ideology.
 • Th e subject’s knowledge of ideology is articulated symbolically and can even 
include the critique of ideology, leading to a cynical distance from the reign-
ing universal, but the subject’s unconscious beliefs depend on their relation 
to the enjoyment of the Other, so that contemporary subjects typically disa-
vow ideology while participating in the ritual (they “know very well … but 
still, they are doing it”).
 • Th e role of the unconscious social fantasy is to conceal the fact that the 
Other cannot guarantee the identity of the subject, a situation that Žižek 
describes as the inconsistency of the Other, the non-existence of the big 
Other and lack in the Other. Th e social fantasy achieves this eﬀ ect through 
its retroactive narration of political contingency as historical necessity in a 
fantasy of social origins that masks the lack of any guarantee that the social 
order can provide what its ideals specify (e.g. equality, liberty, solidarity).
Accordingly, the distinction between symbolic identiﬁ cation and the Real of 
enjoyment structured by fantasy implies four major theses on ideology:
 (a) Every ideological universal, or statement of the norm, entails reference, at 
the level of the enunciation, to a set of inherent transgressions of the norm, 
which are the focus for prohibited enjoyment. Th is thesis is represented in 
Žižek’s work directly and through a series of equivalent claims: every uni-
versal implies a non-universalizable kernel of singular enjoyment; demo-
cratic politics is supported by nationalist enjoyment; universal human rights 
are supported by an obscene enjoyment of torture and assassination; the 
public legal framework is supported by an unwritten code of illicit enjoy-
ment; the Symbolic Law is sustained by the Real of a superego imperative 
to “enjoy!” transgression.
 (b) Th e kernel of enjoyment that sustains ideology is subjectivized as a relation 
between the subject and the big Other, as representation of the socio-cul-
tural ﬁ eld, with enjoyment as the stake of this relation. Th e subject uncon-
sciously believes that the Other demands a sacriﬁ ce of enjoyment from the 
subject, and/or the subject believes that the marginalized ﬁ gure generated 
by social antagonism threatens to steal the enjoyment of the Other. Th e logic 
of the sacriﬁ ce of enjoyment is at the heart of the ideology of fascism, where 
the subject assumes the perverse role of an instrument of the enjoyment of 
an Other who must extract the sacriﬁ cial enjoyment from some marginal-
ized group. It is also at the centre of orthodox interpretations of Christian-
ity, where identiﬁ cation with Christ is made on the basis of the assumption 
that the cruciﬁ xion of Jesus happened because he oﬀ ered himself as both the 
instrument of God’s demand for sacriﬁ ce and the sacriﬁ ce itself. Th e fantasy 
of the “theft of enjoyment” is the basis for both the ethnic nationalism that 
emerged in the 1990s and the democratic imperialism of the “War on Ter-
ror”, both of which depend upon a threatening ﬁ gure of absolute Otherness 
who embodies the phantasmatic danger that the existence of negativity (of 
the ethnic other, or of the terrorist other) might prevent the harmonious 
fullness of the political community. Likewise, Žižek argues that multicul-
turalist tolerance, which apparently manages to include a range of ethnic 
others within the political community, only succeeds because it ultimately 
rests upon the exclusion of supposedly absolute Others, such as the Islamic 
fundamentalist or the illegal migrant, who are the focus for social fantasies 
about the introduction of intolerance into otherwise tolerant societies, the 
undermining of job opportunities that make cohesion possible, and so forth 
– all of which are forms of the fantasy of the theft of enjoyment.
 (c) Th e distinction between symbolic universality and real singularity implies 
the diﬀ erence between symbolically articulated knowledge and unconscious 
belief, centred on the subject’s fantasies about the enjoyment of the Other. 
By virtue of the knowledge produced by ideology critique, the subject can 
be highly critical about the oﬃ  cial ideology of the political community and 
manage to maintain a cynical distance from explicit ideological proposition. 
But this does not aﬀ ect the subject’s unconscious beliefs structured by the 
fantasy of the enjoyment of the Other, with the consequence that the subject 
projects their beliefs onto others (the rest of the political community, ethnic 
group or religious collective; the marginalized ﬁ gures of social antagonism). 
On the one hand, this means that subjects can believe through these oth-
ers, that is, they can project their unconscious beliefs onto dupes supposed 
explicitly to believe in the nation, the bond of blood and soil, or the colour-
ful narratives of religious doctrines, which allows the subject to continue to 
perform the ideological rituals of politics, ethnicity or religion, “so as not to 
disturb the ignorant”. On the other hand, the subject projects their fanta-
sies about transgressive enjoyment onto the marginalized ﬁ gures of social 
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antagonism, who are supposed to believe that abhorrent practices bring an 
illicit thrill. Th e discursive marker for unconscious projection about trans-
gressive enjoyment is the subject’s absolute certainty about what others 
believe. Žižek can therefore decode, for instance, the declarations of the 
West on what Islamic fundamentalists or neo-Nazi terrorists believe (e.g. 
that the Other demands that unbelievers must be put through agony before 
being beheaded), as admissions about the fantasy of illicit enjoyment at the 
heart of democratic ideology (which acts as if those who do not believe in 
democracy may freely be tortured and assassinated).
 (d) Th e fantasies about the enjoyment of the Other that sustain ideology have as 
their purpose concealment of the inconsistency (the contingency, or the par-
tisanship) of the Other. Th e social fantasy represents the Other as providing 
a guarantee for the identity of the subject by ensuring a harmonious society 
and full meaning. Th is is equivalent to the claim that the social fantasy sus-
tains symbolic identiﬁ cation by displacing the disturbing stain of enjoyment 
from the Other onto the marginalized other or the subject itself. Th e most 
important ideological instance of this function of the social fantasy is the 
transformation, through retroactive narration about social origins, of politi-
cal contingency into historical necessity. For instance, communist ideology 
represents the Russian Revolution as the inevitable result of social evolution, 
so that instead of a chancy event involving political partisanship and a social 
change made without any guarantee of success, the revolution appears as the 
necessary result of the historical process. Žižek also speaks in this connec-
tion about fantasy disguising the “non-existence of the Other”, that is, the 
lack of a ﬁ nal signiﬁ er that, as a guarantee of meaning, would assign a ﬁ xed 
position to all of the other signiﬁ ers, or the lack of a teleological goal to his-
tory that would guarantee an “end of history” after the revolution.
In his work in the last decade, Žižek detects a mutation in the ﬁ eld of ideol-
ogy in liberal-democratic capitalism, where cynical distance towards ideology is 
increasingly replaced by the complete absence of political ideals. Th e contem-
porary social ﬁ eld consists of “atonal worlds, lacking the master-signiﬁ er”, in 
which subjects are exposed to a superego imperative to “enjoy!” not only con-
sumerism, but also the inherent transgressions constitutive of national solidarity. 
Neo-conservatism, for instance, arises as a response to the situation of a social 
ﬁ eld that resembles a heterogeneous patchwork of ﬂ oating signiﬁ ers lacking the 
quilting point of a master-signiﬁ er, with neo-liberal economics plus a politics of 
social conservatism designed to reinforce a “minimally authoritarian spirit of 
community”. Liberalism has dissolved the master-signiﬁ er as an authoritarian 
imposition, but what this leaves is the dimension beyond interpellation of the 
superego and fantasy, lacking a set of ideals that might at least regulate enjoyment.
Geoff Boucher
SEE ALSO Althusser; Fantasy; Subject
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